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ABSTRACT
While the United States requires fixation for an original work to be entitled to federal
copyright protection, many other countries ignore such requirement. The difference could lead to
partial copyright protection standards across jurisdictions over certain works that are not fixed.
Examples of such works include extemporaneous speeches, lectures, improvisational
performances, and contemporary arts that are transitory. Moreover, with today’s rapid
development of arts and technologies, creative works can be presented via new media without
being fixed in a traditional way. The examples include live streams of lectures and music
performances, which have become part of the “new normal.” In order to tackle the issue of the
necessity of fixation, this paper looks into a brief historical development of copyright law,
followed by an overview of copyright legislations of civil law countries in which authors of
unfixed works enjoy copyright protection. The research then examines American copyright law
and its unsettled definition of fixation, which articulates how the fixation requirement could easily
exclude a large quantity of creative work from copyright protection. Lastly, the paper studies the
roles of registration and deposition as copyright formalities in the United States to see whether
they serve the same functions as the fixation requirement does. As registration and deposition
formalities can perform the fixation requirement’s tasks, in light of promoting useful arts and
rewarding authors for their creativity regardless of the form of expression, the paper suggests
fixation as a federal copyright prerequisite could be entirely discarded.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Improvisational theater (“improv”) is a theatrical performance spontaneously and
collectively created by the actors on stage employing creativity.1 During a performance, dialogues
may include stories and jokes created as a stage improvisation product. In the United States,
improv has continuously gained popularity; there are at least one hundred and forty-six improv
reported groups in America, making the country the second most popular improv destination in
the world after Germany. 2 Even with the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, improv
popularity remains, with venues being moved to online platforms, 3 allowing borderless audiences
to enjoy live streaming of improv shows. Nonetheless, under the current copyright regime, none
of the dialogues and even choreographies that may occur during an improv session are protectable
in the United States. Regardless of how much creativity the artists have put into their pieces, if the
improvisational expressions have not been scripted prior, they would not enjoy copyright
protection. That is because unscripted works do not pass a requirement called “fixation,” a
copyright prerequisite under the United States jurisdiction.
Fixation, however, is not a copyright prerequisite in civil law countries. In China, for
instance, a court has recognized an oral lecture as a copyright subject matter.4 Thus, the difference
creates a partial copyright protection standard across jurisdictions over unfixed works. Using
improv as an example, the dialogues improvised during a show may be copyrightable in the civil

1

See R. Keith Sawyer, Improvisation and the Creative Process: Dewey, Collingwood, and the Aesthetics of
Spontaneity, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 58, No. 2, Improvisation in the Arts, 149 (2000).
2

See List of Improv Groups Worldwide, IMPROVWIKI (Dec. 24, 2020),
https://improwiki.com/en/list_of_improv_groups_worldwide.

3

See, e.g., IMPRO THEATRE, https://improtheatre.com/livestreaming/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2020) (which live-streams
more than 20 improv performances in December 2020).

4

See Chapter 3.3.
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law countries, but not in the United States. Appropriation of jokes in an improv act live streamed
from Germany, for instance, would be permissible in the United States, whereas in Germany, such
act constitutes copyright infringement. As a result, the German improv artists may find a hard time
seeking remedies against the misappropriation under the U.S. copyright law.5 Such problem does
not only concern works of improv, but also any oral speeches, college lectures, improvisational
music, User Generated Content (UGC) 6, and contemporary arts that have inherently changeable
mediums.

Justifications and Critiques of Fixation
As fixation can simply exclude certain types of creative arts from copyright protection,
why is fixation worth having? First, it is suggested that fixation is designed to play an evidentiary
role, avoiding difficult problems with respect to proof in copyright law.7 Fixation will help ensure
that “a copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence”8 so that the court
can determine if an infringement has occurred. 9 Second, fixation serves public interests, making
creative works perceivable and easier to be circulated.10 Having copyright works fixed, the society
is able to avoid copying previous works; thus, they can be fully enriched from creative works.11
5

Even with the Berne’s National Treatment, the United States is not obliged to discard the fixation requirement to
conform with German copyright law. See Chapter 2.2.
6

See Elizabeth White, The Berne Convention's Flexible Fixation Requirement: A Problematic Provision for UserGenerated Content, 13 CHI. J. INT'l L. 685 (2013) (contending that certain UGC may not surpass the “more than
transitory time” test of fixation).
7

See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687 (2003).; See also Yoav Mazeh,
Modifying Fixation: Why Fixed Works Need to Be Archived to Justify the Fixation Requirement, 8 LOY. L. & TECH.
ANN. 109, 137 (2008).
8
Russ VerSteeg, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: Jurimetric Copyright: Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 (1994).
9

MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 55-56 (3d ed. 1999).

10

Lichtman, supra note 7, at 723.

11

Mazeh, supra note 7, at 119.
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Third, a fixation requirement helps distinguish authors who seek copyright protection from those
who have copyright protection as an afterthought. 12 It is observed that fixation does not create
unreasonable burden to copyright seekers as fixation is cheap, easy, and intuitive for the author’s
own interest.13 Therefore, fixation helps make sure that copyright law applies to “limited set of
intellectual products” rather than “the ordinary stream of speech.”14
Nonetheless, today’s American fixation requirement is argued to be not practically
effective in serving these justifications. As it does not require a work to survive to the time of
litigation,15 there is no point of differentiation at all between a work that has never been fixed and
a work which has its medium destroyed. 16 Fixation, therefore, is not effectively capable of
providing an evidence. Also, even if a work is fixed, without property keeping the fixed copy,
neither the evidentiary nor the indication justifications are satisfied in case the copy is immediately
disposed after being created.17 The third parties cannot identify the boundaries of the copyrighted
content of the work that has lost its fixed copy, making them unable to enjoy the copyrighted work
fully.18
Moreover, the statutory requirement of authorship-as-fixation19, in fact, creates significant
troubles for performers of creative work seeking copyright protection. Unlike Britain’s fixation
requirement which does not limit the fixation authority solely to the author, the American version

12

Lichtman, supra note 7, at 724.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 729.

15

Id. at 732. (noting that the reason is to avoid imposing unreasonable burden to authors).

16

Id. at 733.

17

Mazeh, supra note 7, at 138.

18

Id.

19

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (stating that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression… by or under the
authority of the author).

3

limits the authority of fixation to the authors only. 20 This limitation only supports the author’s
subjective value justification that helps indicate the works worth protected; however, it does not
necessarily support the evidentiary and public interest purposes which can be satisfied as long as
the works are fixed regardless of authority.21 The strict application of the authorship-as-fixation
requirement rejects the efforts of performers of creative works in seeking copyright protection and,
thus, is constitutionally questionable.22 The requirement of author’s authority for fixation may also
lead to unwelcome ownership implications when a copyright issue is related to unconventional
expressions of creativity. One example is the idea of setting up a camera for an animal to press the
shutter, such as in Naruto v. Slater.23 Another example is the use of new surveillance technologies,
including drones, Google Glasses, and new voyeurism recording devices, which make video
recording easy and constant. 24 Given that a minimal threshold of originality could somehow be
proved by the person conducting the surveillance, granting him copyright protection might not be
an ideal result for the creators of creative works that may have been recorded.25 Thus, “a strict
authorship-as-fixation rule betrays copyright law's role in recognizing and rewarding creativity
and denies copyright interests to the very individuals who have provided significant, if not the
most important, original contributions to works within copyright's traditional subject matter.” 26

20

Mazeh, supra note 7, at 137.

21

Id.

22

John Tehranian, Sex, Drones & Videotape: Rethinking Copyright's Authorship-Fixation Conflation in the Age of
Performance, 68 Hastings L.J. 1319, 1346 (2017) (the author finds that authorship-as-fixation is not explicitly
expressed in the Constitution).

23

See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018) (a copyright case where an animal rights organization, on
behalf of Naruto the monkey, claimed authorship over photographs that monkey took of itself).
24

Tehranian, supra note 22, at 1355.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 1370.

4

This thesis will argue further to support the proposition that the American fixation
requirement needs to be readdressed. Specifically, the thesis suggests that fixation could be entirely
discarded. In forming arguments, a comparative study of American copyright law with foreign
copyright laws will be presented through Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 5 will emphasize the
importance of protecting unfixed works, and Chapter 6 will discuss the roles of registration and
deposition formalities under the American copyright regime. These discussions lead to a
conclusion that copyright fixation in the United States may no longer be necessary. The conclusion
is based on the following reasons.
First, fixation is now having a hard time to fit in today’s word full of rapidly developing
technologies, resulting in different courts interpreting the requirement differently. As the unsettled
definition of fixation creates uncertainty of copyright protection, authors of creative works may
end up feeling reluctant to express their ideas in an unconventional or traditional but unfixed
artform.
Second, the formalities of registration and deposition can replace the fixation requirement.
All the said justifications of fixation discussed above can be satisfied by today’s registration and
deposition formalities. To illustrate, when an author registers or deposits a work, he must provide
the Copyright Office with at least one copy of his work. And a copy, by its nature, requires some
kind of fixation. Although the roles of formalities have been reduced to the point that they are no
longer a prerequisite to copyright protection, American authors are still more than highly
incentivized to register and/or deposit their works. Thus, having fixation as a prerequisite to
copyright protection is redundant.
Third, by discarding the fixation requirement, authors will be given an opportunity to prove
copyright ownership before a federal court once his unfixed work has been allegedly infringed.

5

Chances to prove copyright ownership over an unfixed work are common in civil law jurisdictions
where fixation is not a copyright prerequisite. In light of promoting useful arts, authors of creative
unfixed works, no matter where they live, deserve a chance to seek protection from copyright law.

6

2. FIXATION THEN AND NOW
Why do some countries require work to be fixed for copyright protection while some countries
do not? Perhaps, part of the reasons lies in how copyright concepts originated and developed. This
chapter briefly explores the two fundamental yet opposite concepts of early copyright laws. The
presumption made in this Chapter is that a modern fixation requirement is a product of the
embodiment emphasis of the early Anglo-American copyright that sought to protect copies of
works. In contrast, the author's rights in their intellectual expression were regarded as critical
during the French Revolution, when copyright statutes were born in France. The latter concept
later became a model to "nearly all the copyright statutes except the Anglo-Saxon ones." 27
Consequently, without binding provisions on fixation requirements under international law,
countries that may have followed the French copyright conception tend to discard fixation as a
requirement for copyright protection.
2.1 Early Copyright Statutes
2.1.1

Statue of Anne (1710)

In the 15th Century, Gutenberg’s printing press was “the new technology” that introduced a
new commercial activity: sales of published copies of books. The innovation allowed
reproductions of literature to be made on a large scale for the first time.28 Considering literature as
a “dangerous” art, the British Crown desired press control and, thus, assigned a monopolistic
power to the Stationers’ Company. The controversy led to the conclusion of the Statute of Anne
in 1710, which eventually put an end to the censorship system in England by giving back the
authors’ copyrights.29
27

Rudolf Monta, The Concept of Copyright versus the Droit D'Auteur, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1959).

28

CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 16 (6th ed 2003).

29

Id.

7

As used at the time of the Statute of Anne, the term “copyright” was highly descriptive. The
term referred to the exclusive rights of owners over “copies” of books to print and publish. 30 The
Statute titles itself “[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed
books in the authors or purchasers of such copies during the time therein mentioned.”31 The Statute
conferred a reproduction right on an author for fourteen years which is renewable for another
fourteen until his death.32 Without consent, printing, reprinting or importing of the book amount
to an infringement.33
Copies of books could be considered the primary protectable subject matter in the copyright
world. At least during that time, copies could not be made by other means than employing writing,
printing, or reprinting. As the Statute only granted authors rights over the copies of their writings,
the works that had not been written down and were incapable of getting reprinted would be
unprotected by the Statute. Therefore, books or copies were the only recognized copyright
mediums back then, and the act of fixing or writing on those mediums was the key to copyright
protection under the Statute of Anne. The concept of fixation, therefore, came into existence at the
very moment the world’s first copyright statute was born.
2.1.2

The Early American Copyright System

The English Statute of Anne as an “incentive to authors to create so that the public may have
access to and be enriched by their works” largely influenced the development of the American
copyright system. 34 Drafted in 1787, the United States Constitution resembled the underlying

30

Id. at 3.

31

Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, Ch. 19, at Title (emphasis added).

32

Id. § 1.

33

JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 18.

34

Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 Tul. L.
Rev. 991, 998 (1990).

8

policy of the Statute of Anne with a clause stating that “Congress shall have power… to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries”. 35 The intent of the Clause was later
understood for the public benefits rather than primarily for the benefit of the author. 36 The
“writings” are what Congress is authorized to protect 37, not directly the “authors.”38
Following the constitutional clause, the first U.S. Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. Maps,
charts, and books were the first three subject matters protected by the Act, 39 followed by musical
compositions in 1831.40 The scope of protectable subject matters greatly expanded in 1909 to cover
periodicals, prepared speeches, dramatic compositions, drawings, prints, photographs, and works
of arts.41 Congress did not attempt to make an exhaustive listing and focused attention on the
qualities of works creation process; as a result, the concept of fixation came into play.42 To this
point, it is noticeable that all the historical media protected in the early U.S. copyright acts require
fixation by nature. Courts and Congress had long recognized the fixation requirement before
formally introduced into federal law by the Copyright Act of 1976.43

35

U.S. Const. art. 8, § 8, cl. 8.

36

Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 999.

37

Lichtman, supra note 7, at 718.

38

Paul Goldstein, What is a Copyrighted Work – Why Does It Matter, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1175 (2011).

39

Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.

40

Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat, 436 Chap. 16.

41

Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 5.

42

See Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law, 10
Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 17, 21 (2014). See also Chapter 2.

43

Lichtman, supra note 7, at 719.
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2.1.3

French Revolutionary Copyright

French copyright law is the fruit of the French Revolution. In principle, it is “an exclusive
right is conferred on authors because of their intellectual creation.”44 Somewhat similar to what
happened in England before the Statute of Anne, a monopoly in printings had existed prior to the
French Revolution.45 However, as opposed to Anglo-American copyright law as society-oriented,
the French Revolution had developed a more author-oriented conception of copyright.46 In other
words, while the U.S. copyright law is utilitarian and materialistic with focuses on protecting the
pecuniary and exploitative interests, the French copyright law has a broader scope of protection
that covers the author’s intellectual and moral interests.47
There are two important Revolutionary copyright statutes; one enacted in 1791, followed by
the second in 1793. These two statutes “served as the essential legal test” for the present French
copyright law, the copyright statute of 1957—amended in 1985.48 The 1791 decree, however, did
not center on the author’s right from the beginning. The decree’s underlying policy was to
terminate a certain monopoly power that existed during the time by enlarging the public domain. 49
After the 1792 decree, which limited the authors’ rights with a burden to notify the public of their
rights and shortening the protection term of many playwrights, there was a shift from the public
domain principle toward a more author’s right approach in 1793.50

44

Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 991-92.

45

Monta, supra note 27, 178.

46

Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 993.

47
Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American
Law Compared, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 549, 551 (2006).
48

Jane C. Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 269, 270
(1989).

49

Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 1006.

50

Id. at 1009.
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Although having the same goal of advancing public interests, the Anglo-Saxon copyright law
differs considerably from the French copyright law. An overall comparison suggests that while the
former encourages utility, the latter promotes beauty. 51 The primary subject matters under the early
U.S. copyright statutes, as previously discussed, were protected in a pragmatic view of achieving
the constitutional objective; therefore, they were “highly useful” productions. 52 The 1793 French
copyright law, on the other hand, protected both “writings of all kinds” and “all productions of the
beaux-arts.” 53 Consequently, theatrical plays were regarded as examples of historic copyright
subject matters that the French Revolutionary law sought to protect.54
2.2 The Berne Convention and Fixation Requirement
Despite the two opposing approaches to copyright protection as discussed above, most
copyright laws worldwide have been greatly harmonized through many international treaties on
intellectual property. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, in
particular, was concluded in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland, to provide a unified copyright standard
to its member states.55 The Berne standard contains provisions ensuring the “minimum protection,”
based on the three principles: “National Treatment,” “Independent Protection,” and “Automatic
Protection.”56 Accordingly, formalities such as copyright notice and registration functioned as a

51

Id.

52

Id. at 1015.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 1016 (“the utility of dramatic works in disseminating the Enlightenment and the Revolution” is stressed)

55

WIPO-Administered Treaties, WIPO LEX (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (currently, there are about one hundred and seventynine members).
56

Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886),
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html (last visited Sept 6, 2020).
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tool of increasing evidentiary value to copyright works have to be partially removed pursuant to
the latter principle.57
However, with regard to the fixation requirement, Article 2(2) states that “[i]t shall, however,
be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any
specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material
form.”58 The Article suggests a non-binding term, leaving the contracting parties to decide whether
to impose a fixation requirement in their national laws for copyright protection of original works. 59
As a result, some countries require a work of authorship to be fixed to be entitled to protection,
while many others do not have this requirement. Generally, jurisdictions with a civil law system
do not incorporate fixation as a prerequisite for copyright protection, unlike the copyright regimes
in common law countries. 60 This difference leads to partial protection of the same work across
jurisdictions, meaning that an unfixed work that receives copyright protection in a country of origin
may not enjoy the same protection in foreign jurisdictions that have a fixation requirement.
Although the partial protection issue has been eased by Berne’s National Treatment principle,
countries with a fixation requirement are still not required to discard the requirement to protect
unfixed works of foreign nationals.61

57

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), art. 5(2), 828 UN Treaty Ser 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
58

Id. art. 2(2)

59

White, supra note 6, at 687.

60

Elizabeth Adeney, Authorship and Fixation in Copyright Law: A Comparative Comment, 35 Melb. U. L. Rev.
677, 689 (2011); see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 71
61

White, supra note 6, at 690 (Berne’s Article 5(1) only requires countries of the Union other than the country of
origin to grant the same rights they “grant to their nationals”).

12

3. JURISDICTIONS WITH NO FIXATION REQUIREMENT
In this Chapter, copyright legislations under five jurisdictions will be briefly discussed. The
first national copyright law is that of France, a nation with the most creator-approached version of
this law.62 Another iteration to be presented, the Germany Copyright Act, falls under the same EU
Directive. Moreover, to give a broader overview, copyright legislations of civil law countries in
Asia—China and Thailand—will also be examined.
Although all copyright statutes being discussed do not have fixation as a requirement for
copyright protection, each country has different approaches in listing protectable subject matters.
Importantly, their laws suggest that not all unfixed works are copyrightable. Some jurisdictions
have statutory conditions of the medium of recordation on certain works. Some even have judicial
interpretations that exclude certain unfixed works from copyright protection. Moreover, unlike the
US jurisdiction, these four jurisdictions separate works protectable under related or neighboring
rights from copyright subject matters. For the works that fall under the neighboring rights, fixation,
most of the time, is a vital component. This requirement is found both in the EU under the Directive
2001/29/EC63 and in the two Asian nations under discussion. Nonetheless, one will see that the
copyright laws of these countries agree to suggest copyright protection over oral works, such as
speeches and lectures, that have not been prepared in writing. As a result, there have been cases in
which courts granted protection over non-transcribed works.

62

Piotraut, supra note 47, at 553.

63

Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society O.J. (L167), 10-19 (art. 2 stating initial
fixation is a prerequisite for production rights in performances, films, and broadcasting).
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3.1 France
Under the French jurisdiction, copyright work results from the creation of the mind and is,
therefore, the most personal of all properties. 64 This notion is reflected in the very first article of
its copyright legislation, which states that "[t]he author of a work of the mind shall enjoy in that
work, by the mere fact of its creation, property right which shall be enforceable against all
persons.”65 Reading together with the following provision, which stipulates that work creation
occurs "by the mere fact of realization,”66 another critical conclusion is formed—no other actions,
except thinking, are required for a work to receive protection. And such protection shall be granted
to “all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.” 67 The
language of the law suggests that French copyright law is highly flexible in accommodating and
adapting to new forms of expressions and technologies.68 Accordingly, works that do not have
mediums are also entitled to protection. Speeches, addresses, sermons, and pleadings are
protectable and are listed as protectable subject matters.69
However, although the list is non-exhaustive, not everything is copyrightable; there is
creativity or independent creation that demonstrates the expression of authors’ personality as a
prerequisite for copyright protection.70 Moreover, the statute itself even imposes conditions on
particular works. Choreographic works, circus acts and feats, and dumb-show works, in particular,

64

Monta, supra note 27, at 178.

65

Intellectual Property Code [Civil Code] art. L111-1 (Fr.) [hereinafter Fr. IP Code]

66

Id. art. L111-2.

67

Id. art. L112-1.

68

Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 273.

69

Fr. IP Code art. L112-2(2).

70

Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 274.
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need to be written down to be considered work of the mind. 71 In fact, not everything falls within
Article L112-1; in 2008, a court ruled that the fragrance of perfume was not a form of expression
that could enjoy copyright protection. 72 Furthermore, there exists a fixation requirement for
neighboring rights pursuant to the Directive. Unlike the US jurisdiction, in which sound recordings
and motion pictures or audiovisual works are within the scope of copyright 73, in France, these
works fall in the neighboring rights regime in which producers have a responsibility for the initial
fixation.74
Nevertheless, due to the lack of a general fixation requirement for most works, the Court of
Appeals in Marle c. Lacordaire 75 granted copyright protection over sermons. A copyright
infringement was found for the defendant publisher, who transcribed and edited the sermons of
the plaintiff without consent. For two reasons, the court emphasized the importance of protecting
oral discourse as a copyrighted work. First, the author had the right to profit from his individual
work, and, second, based on the author’s ‘personnalité morale’, “the author should always
preserve the rights to revise and correct his own work, to survey the fidelity of the reproduction
and to choose the time and mode of publication.”76 The court also stated further that:
Because in effect the orator delivers his speech only, without giving up the
power of disposal of his thought through printing; on the contrary it is
essential for him to preserve the fruits of his labor, to remain the sole judge
of the opportune moment for its publication and to keep guard against
damaging alterations of his work.77
71

Fr. IP Code art. L112-2(4).

72

Court of Cassation, Civil, Commercial Division Jul. 1, 2008, 07-13.952 (Nov. 26, 2020),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000019127786&fast
ReqId=1714620208&fastPos=1.
73

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).

74

Fr. IP Code art. L211-4.

75

Cou.* de Lyon, 17 Jul. 1845, D.1845.2.128.

76

Id. at 129.

77

Id.
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3.2 Germany
Without a lengthy statutory language describing how a copyrighted work is created, the
German Copyright Act protects “the author’s own intellectual creation,”78 and the author is simply
“the creator of the work.”79 Similar to the French copyright jurisprudence, the scope of protection
under the German copyright law extends to “intellectual and personal relationships to the work
and in respect of the use of the work.”80 Although there exists no provision stating that the German
copyright law protects works regardless of their form of expression like France’s, the fact that
“speeches” are on the list of protectable subject matters 81 implies that the German copyright
jurisprudence does not incorporate fixation as a requirement for its copyright protection. 82 Apart
from that, there is no statutory condition of writing down for choreography works to be entitled to
copyright protection as existed in the French law.83 In this instance, the language of the law alone
suggests that the German law discards fixation to a greater extent than that of France. It is observed
that the law requires a copyrighted work to exist in a perceptible form rather than a material form. 84
Still, a fixation requirement is a prerequisite for protecting particular works that fall within the
related rights provisions in accordance with the Directive.
Nonetheless, the Hamburg District Court has surprisingly rejected copyright protection on the
ground of a lack of fixation as it addressed whether artists could be considered as “art” within the
meaning of the copyright act. While not directly stated in the language of the law, the court found
78
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“[n]o copyright protection because artists and work are identical. There is no fixation that can be
separated from the person of the author. There is no property right in in the person.”85 Thus, one
might find that although the copyright act of Germany does not mention fixation, the courts may
possibly find the need for fixation in some instances.
3.3 China
The copyright law in China is ambiguous whether fixation is needed for a work to be protected
by the law.86 While Article 3 of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China expressly
states that oral works are to be protected 87 , Article 2 of the Implementing Regulations limits
copyright protection to the works capable of being reproduced in a tangible form.88 Defining oral
works, Article 4(2) of the Implementing Regulations states, “oral works are works which are
created in spoken words and have not been fixed on any material carrier, such as impromptu
speeches, lectures and court debates.” 89 Thus, it is suggested that works that can be fixed but are
not yet done, are eligible for copyright protection. 90 Supporting this suggestion, Beijing Haidian
District Court, in 2006, granted copyright protection over English teacher’s lectures and found the
defendant’s unauthorized recording and distributing the class instructions in the forms of MP3 files
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a copyright infringement.91 With regard to computer programs, however, the Software Regulations
specifically require fixation in a tangible medium for the works to be protected. 92
3.4 Thailand
Enacted in 1994, the Thai Copyright Act protects works of authorship “regardless of the
method or form in which such works are expressed.”93 Unlike jurisdictions discussed above, the
list of subject matters under Thai copyright law is definitive. 94 As Section 4 of the Act expanding
the exhaustive list with detailed definitions to each subject matter terminology, one can,
accordingly, find protectable unfixed works in the language of the Act. Literary works within the
meaning of the Act include lectures, sermons, addresses, and speeches.

95

Moreover,

“choreography, dancing, gesturing, or a performance which is made up as a story, and shall include
a mime performance” are included within the scope of copyright protectable dramatic works.96
Thus, legal scholars have concluded that upon an expression of an idea or performance in a
choreography work, even without labanotation, the work is immediately protected by the Thai
Copyright Act.97 Nonetheless, there is a fixation condition on audiovisual, cinematographic works,
sound recordings, and photos.98 These works fall in the copyright protection sphere and are not
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under the related right provisions.99 As the stated works require fixation by their nature already,
the law does not impose any additional burdens to authors.
In Supreme Court Decision no. 13159/2555, the Thai Supreme Court determined whether the
plaintiff, an actor hired to entertain a meeting, was entitled to the performer’s rights. To grant the
stated right, the Court must first analyze the copyrightability of the work behind the plaintiff’s
performance. In doing so, it only took into consideration the content in such performance whether
it falls into any subject matters listed under the Copyright Act. At the meeting, although the
plaintiff engaged in singing and dancing, the plaintiff, for the most part, was responsible for
interviewing guests and hosting activities. As a result, the Court found that such performance was
for mere entertainment, and there was neither actual musical works nor works of choreography
within the meaning of copyright law involved. 100 Although the Court rejected the plaintiff
performer’s rights as there was no copyrightability over the content performed, it is worth noting
that in doing so, the Court did not take the fixation of the performance into its consideration at all.
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4. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FIXATION REQUIREMENT
Unfixed oral works such as sermons and lectures protectable by copyright law in the above
civil jurisdictions may not enjoy the copyright law's protection in common law jurisdictions. In
the United States, the current copyright regime is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, codified
in Title 17 of the United States Code as a federal law, which explicitly contains fixation as a
copyright prerequisite.101 Therefore, works that are not fixed—though they may be eligible for
“common law copyright,” which is state-created law—are not entitled to federal copyright
protection.102
4.1 Fixation as a prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection
For a work to receive federal copyright protection, it needs to satisfy two requirements:
originality and fixation.103 The originality requirement is embodied in the statutory phrase original
works of authorship.104 Such works, however, do not need “novelty, ingenuity, or [a]esthetic merit
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them…”105 The
first prerequisite, in fact, is determined upon whether there exist an author’s independent creation
and a modest quantum of creativity. 106 To pass this requirement, the work in question cannot be a
mere “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery…”107.
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The second prerequisite, fixation, acts in a manner of a trigger for federal copyright
protection for works that pass the authorship requirement.108 Section 101 stipulates that “[a] work
is ‘created’ when it is ‘fixed’ in a copy or phonorecord for the first time…”. Section 102(a) grants
copyright protection to “works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” In other
words, there is no federal copyright protection for work unless the work is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.109 However, during one’s daily life, the requirement is not so unfamiliar.
“[C]opyright is created every time people set pen to paper or fingers to keyboard and affix their
thoughts in a tangible medium…”, stated the Second Circuit.110
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of fixation had long been associated with
the U.S. copyright regime. The Copyright Act of 1909, for instance, hid the requirement in Section
4 which states “[that] the works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include
all the writings of an author.”111 Nowadays, under the current Act of 1976, the fixation requirement
is directly associated with the constitutional language of the Copyright Clause, which secures “for
limited times to authors… the exclusive rights to their respective writings.”112 The Constitution's
latter-day writings are illustrated by the definition of "copies" and "fixed."113 As a result, given
that a work is “embodied in a physical form capable of being copied,” such work is entitled to be
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constitutional writing.114 In other words, writing under the constitutional extends “to include any
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.” 115
As the current U.S. Copyright Act does not provide an exhaustive list of copyrightable
subject matters, fixation correspondingly becomes a gatekeeper to federal copyright protection.
Without a concrete definition of fixation, a complex issue arises as to whether work at hand
satisfies the fixation requirement and is, therefore, protected by the copyright law. Authors would
have difficulty claiming copyright protection for their works, especially when the mediums are not
the traditional writings. Moreover, apart from the copyrightability side, fixation is a crucial factor
in the infringement analysis. As a copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduction under Section
106(1) prevents unauthorized copying, 116 an alleged infringing work also needs to be fixed to
constitute an unauthorized copy.
4.2 Unsettled Definition of Fixation
An on-going issue of implementing fixation as a copyright prerequisite is that as
technologies keep developing, the definition of fixation must keep up with the technological
change to serve its function properly. Failure to adapt to the new technology and artforms could
potentially discourage authors from exploring new means of creative expression. In 1908, the US
Supreme Court, in White-Smith v. Apollo,117 limited the medium on which a work can be fixed to
only those perceivable by humans. In response to how new technology has changed the way people
perceive arts, Congress overturned White-Smith v. Apollo with Section 102(a) of the Copyright
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Act of 1976, which extends the requirement of fixation to be whatever perceivable with the aids
of a machine or device. In 1982, both the Third Circuit, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l,
Inc,118 and the Seventh Circuit, in Midway v. Artic,119 agreed that intangible copies of inherently
changing digital works in ROM, a computer memory component, constitute sufficient copyright
fixation. Nonetheless, conflicts started when considering fixation with another computer memory
device called RAM. While the Ninth Circuit, in MAI Systems Corps. v. Peak Computer Inc,120
ruled that data stored in RAM surpasses the “more than transitory duration” requirement under
Section 101, the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 121 disagreed. The
Cartoon Network’s strict “more than transitory duration” requirement poses difficulties in seeking
copyright protection over non-conventional art forms, especially when the mediums are perishable.
Respectively, the Seventh Circuit, in Kelly v. Chicago Park District,122 and the Central District
Court of California, in Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers,123 denied fixation of sculptural works in
forms of gardens and a food bowl respectively.
4.2.1

Perceptibility

The first case brought into discussion is White-Smith v. Apollo.124 Decided before the 1796
Copyright Act was enacted, it is an early example showing the judicial disinclination to deal with
new technologies on information storage.125 The issue presented before the court was whether a
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copy needed to be perceivable only by humans, as the lawsuit was brought by a composer of two
certain musical compositions published in the form of sheet music, namely ‘Little Cotton Dolly’
and ‘Kentucky Babe’ against the company, Apollo Records. The defendant, Apollo, engaged in
distributing a ‘players piano’ invention called the “Apollo” and perforated rolls of music
embodying the two compositions used in connection therewith. These rolls in question were
designed to be used specifically with the Apollo device, making them not capable of being read
by skilled performers as ordinary pieces of music.
The appellant, the composers, argued that musical composition was “the thing which
Congress intended to protect and that such protection covers all means of expression of the order
of the notes which produce the air or melody which the composer has invented.”126 The Supreme
Court, however, narrowed the definition of copy of a musical composition to “a written or printed
record of it in intelligible notation.”127 For musical composition, the court gave this definition: “is
not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and read.”128
Thus, although the perforated rolls can produce musical tones when used with the adapted
mechanism, “…we cannot think they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act,” said
Justice Day.129
This decision, however, was later overturned by the language of the 1976 Copyright Act
in which Section 102(a) stipulates that fixation occurs on “any tangible medium of expression”
that is “now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
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otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 130 Congress
specifically wrote this provision to avoid “artificial and largely justifiable distinctions” like the
one from White-Smith that put copyrightability of a work upon the form or medium in which the
work is fixed.131 This open-ended language’s intention was to accommodate new technologies and
art forms; nonetheless, it still led to conflicts of court decisions later on.
In addition to Section 102(a), the Copyright Act of 1976 also brings Section 101 to help
identify the occurrence of fixation. The provision states that “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration”. 132 However, as technology and artistic ideas have expanded, the
statutory language has been questioned from time to time. To what extent does the law require a
medium to be perceivable, reproducible, or communicable? In particular, what it means by having
a work fixed in a medium that can last for a “transitory duration” is still debatable. Different courts
have interpreted the phrase differently.
4.2.2

Intangible copies

The two court decisions presented in this subsection attempted to answer whether an
inherently changeable digital work could be fixed by virtue of Section 102(a), in particular when
there is interactivity as an element. Firstly, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc. 133, the
case was brought by the producer of an early arcade game “Defender” against Artic International
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on the ground of unauthorized replication of the video game. The plaintiff, Williams Electronics,
manufactured video game machines operated by electronic circuit boards having tiny chips called
ROMs (Read Only Memory) as part of the circuit. 134 According to Judge Newman, ROMs function
in this fashion:
The (ROM) stores the instructions and data from a computer
program in such a way that when electric current passes through the
circuitry, the interaction of the program stored in the (ROM) with
the other components of the game produces the sights and sounds of
the audiovisual display that the player sees and hears. The memory
devices determine not only the appearance and movement of the
(game) images but also the variations in movement in response to
the player's operation of the hand controls. 135
One of the subjects of the dispute was the copyrightability of audiovisual elements in the
video game. The arcade had two modes: the “attract mode” and the “play mode.” The former gives
examples of a fixed set of sounds and animations of what Defender would be like when the game
was played. The latter, however, shows a series of sounds and animations interactively with the
player inputs. Although the plaintiff had registered audiovisual works of the two modes with the
Copyright Office, the defendant contended that there could be no copyright protection in either
game modes since the works fail to meet the fixation requirement. 136 According to Artic, fixation
could not occur since a “new” series of images and sounds generate each time when each mode is
displayed.137
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The Third Circuit, nonetheless, had little difficulty rejecting the defendant’s contention.138
The court agreed with the Second Circuit in Stern Electronics139 in finding that the same pattern
of images and sound newly appearing each time in the attract mode satisfies the statutory provision
of “audiovisual works.” Even in the play mode, the court found identifiable expression from the
claimed audiovisual works. Although player interaction causes changes in presentation from one
game to the next, “there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and
sounds of the game, and many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game regardless
of how the player operates the controls.”140 Importantly, the game’s memory devices (ROMs) are
capable of, for the audiovisual works in dispute, constituting a “copy” in which the work is
“fixed.”141 The defendant was, therefore, liable for copying the game.
Similarly, in the following year, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
in Midway v. Artic,142 which ruled in favor of the plaintiff against Artic for copyright infringement
of two video games: Galaxian and Pac-man. Artic, the same defendant from Williams Electronics,
used a similar contention that neither the attract mode nor the play mode could produce
copyrightable audiovisual works. The defendant specifically argued that the audiovisual aspects
were not “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”143 Artic noted that the ROMs in the games
circuit board did not have enough memory to store all audiovisual information at an instant;
therefore, the ROMs were basically generating a new set of pictures all the time. 144 The court found
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the Artic’s argument fails to meet validity by recognizing the disputed works to be capable of
being reproduced with the aid of a machine or device in line with Section 102(a).145 Moreover, the
ROM in question is a later-developed medium of expression, which the Congress has allowed
fixation to occur through Section 102(a).146
The two aforementioned cases opened that the gate for the fixation requirement to stand in
the world of digital technology, where copies of copyright works might not exist in the physical
sense. As a result, fixation no longer became an obstacle to digital works to get federal copyright
protection.147 However, what Midway left behind was a question of what exactly is the “transitory
duration” that a digital copy needs to last.148 After Midway, there have been many attempts to
resolve such a question, which will be discussed below.
4.2.3

Temporary reproductions

The cases illustrated in this sub-section deals explicitly with a temporary storage
technology called RAM. They tried to answer whether data stored in this storage could “be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”
as required by Section 101. Unlike the two court decisions above that are in harmony, the following
ruling resulted in controversy. In short, they are not in line whether the phrase “more than transitory
duration” could be overcome by a “functional” test or should be interpreted strictly with a
specification of time.
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MAI Systems Corps. v. Peak Computer Inc. 149 is one of the early cases in which courts tried
to work with the statutory requirement of Section 101 for digital copies. MAI, the owner of
copyrighted computer programs, brought legal action against Peak, who operated a computer
maintenance business on the ground of unauthorized reproductions of MAI’s works in the course
of Peak’s repair service. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that its computer programs were to
be licensed for personal use, which included necessary internal processing such as loading the
works into the computer’s random access memory (“RAM”). 150 Thus, the plaintiff claimed that
“any copying” done by Peak was beyond the scope of the license, alleging Peak for making
unauthorized copies.151
The significant dispute that followed the claim was whether loading the plaintiff’s software
into RAM involves fixation that would constitute copying under the Copyright Act. RAM
functions by manipulating digital data store in a computer’s permanent storage;152 however, the
data loaded into it can be perceived, reproduced, and otherwise communicated only when the
power is on. 153 When switched off, the data stored in RAM immediately disappears. 154
Considering that the stored data do not last for a transitory duration, the defendant disputed the
district court decision, which holds that copying had occurred within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.155
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The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, affirmed the district court’s decision in this regard—
notwithstanding that RAM was designed to be a temporary storage medium. 156 According to the
court, the reproductions did not need to be absolutely permanent for a copyright infringement
analysis. Instead, “sufficient permanence” was considered with the fact that the reproductions in
RAM were held long enough for the defendant to achieve the computer diagnose purpose. 157 Thus,
the data stored there were adequately shown as being able to “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 158 The ruling of the Ninth Circuit
was, therefore, said to be a “functional” standard as the court considers a reproduction “fixed”
when it makes intended actions possible. 159
Many courts after MAI have agreed with the Nine Circuit. 160 Not long after MAI, the
Eastern District of Virginia in Advanced Computer Service of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems
Corp161 was presented with the very same question—whether a reproduction in RAM constitutes
copying. MAI’s “functional” standard was again adopted by the Advanced district court in
concluding that the contents in RAM were “fixed.” 162 Although the Advanced court found the
occurrence of fixation, it agreed with the defendant, a computer maintenance service provider, that
the data stored in RAM were “ephemeral” and “transitory.”163 Moreover, in 1995, the district court
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in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc164 extended the
MAI doctrine beyond computer programs to the information posted on an electronic bulletin
billboard service ("BBS"). In line with the Ninth Circuit’s “functional” test in MAI, the district
court held that, even though the contents remained in the system for eleven days at maximum, they
were capable of being perceived and thus, were sufficiently fixed.165
Nonetheless, MAI was significantly challenged in the Second Circuit's more recent
decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 166 The disputed technology in Cartoon
Network was an invention of the defendant, Cablevision, called “Remote Storage” Digital Video
Recorder system (“RS-DVR.”) The technology is known as “buffer” and is, again, considered a
type of RAM.167 Acting as working memory, a buffer temporarily holds data that are automatically
being overwritten by new sets of data at all times. 168 The Second Circuit, with the attempt of
imposing a strict “duration requirement” to the definition of “fixed,” ruled that the information
contained in the buffer was not fixed as “no bit of data remains on any buffer more than a fleeting
1.2 seconds.” 169 The court rejected Cartoon Network’s contention, which adhered to the MAI
“functional” test that the data stored in the buffer were not transitory, as they lasted long enough
for Cablevision to make unauthorized reproductions.170
The Cartoon Network’s “1.2-second rule” has been widely criticized. If a “more than
transitory duration” requires more than 1.2 seconds, the following question would be how long
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precisely the statute would need. In SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., the court
mentioned that Cartoon Network suggested a RAM work to last for “at least several minutes … or
until the computer is shut off.171 Criticism of the strict application of the rule is that it would not
follow technology's rapid development. Slingbox, for instance, allows users to stream videos
without saving them into the computer's permanent storage and gives users the ability to control
the buffering process and the length of time the video remains in the buffers. 172 Moreover, Cartoon
Network is a direct conflict in connection with a 2001 DMCA Copyright Office report which states
that in the context of determining fixation of digital copies, “attempting to draw a line based on
duration may be impossible … both in theory and as a matter of proof in litigation.”173
In addition to the Copyright Office, other non-judicial entities have been trying to resolve
digital reproductions' complex issues. The Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), for instance, has issued its final report agreeing that data stored
in RAM can be considered fixed; however, to keep up with how the technology operates,
exceptions are to be granted herewith. 174 Consequently, Section 117 was replaced with Section
117(a) and (b) in 1980.175 Section 117(a) essentially permits reproductions of computer programs
by an owner of a licensed copy, given that they are essential to computer operations.176 After that,
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in 1998, the specific holding in MAI was overturned by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 177
Section 117(c) was added to exempt temporary productions for purposes of computer maintenance
or repair.178 Reading Section 117(c) could imply that Congress supports MAI’s proposition that
ephemeral copies in RAM may constitute unauthorized reproductions under Section 106(1).179
Still, to avoid Cartoon Network's strict duration standard by following the "functional" test
as stipulated in MAI, one must face complex issues arising, especially nowadays when the internet
is part of everyone’s life. Suppose MAI is to become the prevailing standard. In that case, it may
create unreasonable risks to every user in an email chain that contains infringing copyright
materials as email users cannot avoid short-lived reproductions of the contents.180 Moreover, the
mere act of reading infringing works on a website may already impose the reader with
unauthorized reproduction liabilities, as what appears on the web site is automatically stored in the
user computer’s RAM and even hard drive in certain cases.181
4.2.4

Non-static media

Difficulty in defining a ‘fixed’ work does not only reside in the digital world. Physical
objects, in fact, can also pose complex fixation problems. Time and change bring not only new
technologies to the world but also introduce new artforms. In Kelly v. Chicago Park District, the
subject in dispute, presented before the Seventh Circuit, was a garden called “Wildflower Works,”
which Kelly, the plaintiff, promoted as a “living art.”182 Defining this unconventional art form,
Kelly, with his art history expert witness, contended that “Wildflower Works” is both a painting
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and a sculpture within the purposes of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). 183 Thus, by
modifying the garden, the plaintiff alleged that the Park District violated his right to moral right or
the right to “integrity” over the work protected under the Act.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found that the work was not entitled to protection under
VARA, as Wildflower Works did not satisfy the authorship and fixation copyright requirements. 184
Unlike a landscape design of a garden plan, which is put in writing, the garden itself is not a fixed
copy of the gardener’s intellectual property. 185 The planting material is not “stable or permanent
enough to be called ‘fixed.’” While rejecting “absolute” permanence, the court stated:
Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state of perpetual change;
they germinate, grow, bloom, become dormant, and eventually die. This
life cycle moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to season, but
the real barrier to copyright here is not temporal but essential. The
essence of a garden is its vitality, not its fixedness. It may endure from
season to season, but its nature is one of dynamic change. 186
Although the Seventh Circuit did not further rule that fixation was incompatible with all
other inherently non-static media, there has been at least one court decision that extended Kelly’s
reasoning beyond plants.187 In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, an arrangement of food was
brought to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to decide whether it would
pass the copyrightability analysis. The plaintiff, a Chinese food supply company, brought a lawsuit
against its competitor, J&A Importers. The plaintiff contended that the defendant infringed its
copyright by using a photo of arranged Vietnamese rice sticks on the food products packaging.188
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The right over the photograph in dispute was said to be transferred from a third-party photographer.
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed copyright ownership through its creative contribution to the
picture, which is a product of a derivative work. 189 The underlying bowl-of-food “sculpture” was
created by an employee of the plaintiff who arranged a bowl of Asian noodles from egg rolls,
grilled meat, and other garnishes. 190
Regarding the derivative work claim, the court found no copyrightability over the
underlying sculpture. However, the case did not pass the originality test; the court was not
persuaded by the plaintiff’s contention that the employees “chose the foods out of thousands of
possibilities, and directed their arrangement to be in a certain fashion out of infinite
possibilities.”191 Furthermore, the court ruled that even if there had been originality, there would
not have been enough evidence to support that the food bowl has passed the fixation
requirement.192 The court cited Kelly as precedent and compared a bowl of food with a garden; it
found that the nature of food was “inherently changeable” and would ultimately perish. 193 In
conclusion, the court stated that “if the fact that the Wildflower Works garden reviving itself each
year was not sufficient to establish its fixed nature, a bowl of food which, once it spoils is gone
forever, cannot be considered “fixed” for the purposes.”194
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in Kim Seng, the food, though perishable, had already
been depicted in a photograph, which enabled the work to be capable of being perceived and
identified. Thus, the justifications behind fixation discussed in Chapter 1 have all been met—the
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author had expressed his desire to protect the work by hiring a third-party photographer, and
photographs were capable of serving evidentiary and public interest purposes. Yet, the plaintiff
lost its copyright over the sculptural work of food bowl. Notwithstanding the separate issue of
copyright ownership over the photograph, it was fair to argue that the perishable bowl of food had
already been fixed in the picture, making the food arrangement perceptible later. Moreover, it is
questionable whether fixation is convenient and cheap, as observed.195 If taking photos cannot
suffice the fixation of sculptural works of food arrangement, would the authors need to create food
models for fixation? If that was to be the case, fixation, indeed, imposes a significant burden upon
certain authors.
4.2.5

Human body as medium

Apart from food, human bodies are unarguably perishable. The Copyright Act itself
recognizes this very fact by using an author’s life as a part of copyright protection terms. 196
Interestingly, in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 197 the plaintiff, who inked a
registered tattoo called “Tribal Tattoo” for boxer Mike Tyson, sued Warner Bros, the defendant,
for infringingly copied the tattoo. In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that he had never licensed
anyone to use such a design, yet the movie "Hangover 2" depicted the said design's exact
reproduction.198 According to the plaintiff, the tattoo design had been registered at the Copyright
Office and passed the originality and fixation requirements, therefore entitling him valid copyright
over the work.199 By copying the original tattoo from Tyson’s face to an actor’s face, the plaintiff
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alleged that the defendant had constituted an initially unauthorized reproduction.200 Ultimately,
however, the movie was allowed to be released, and the parties settled the case. 201
If the litigation had continued, it would have been interesting to see how the court would
have touched upon the disputed work's copyrightability analysis. A critical question that could be
raised is whether Tyson's face is a part of the plaintiff's tattoo elements. Note that in Chapter 3, the
German Hamburg District Court found no fixation in which the art in question and the artist were
inseparable. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., found no
copyrightability of a person’s persona.202 The court of appeals ruled that a person’s likeness was
not a work of authorship and was not fixed.203 A human body cannot be a medium within the
purposes of the Copyright Act for a persona accordingly.
Given that tattoo is an art that can exist per se, a human body could be deemed a medium
on which the work is expressed. If that is to be the case, the court may have to consider whether
this perishable medium—human’s facial skin—is adequate for fixation purposes under the
Copyright Act. One may argue that human flesh, although perishable, is not inherently changeable
in the way food does and is not in a state of perpetual change, as are seeds and plants. Nonetheless,
what if a person, unfortunately, passes away the day after he got a tattoo? The corpse may be able
to bear the tattoo in perfect shape only for a week or even a few days in some cases. Would this
incident possibly be a tragedy for both the deceased and the tattoo artist?
From a more philosophical perspective, is there such an object that do not ultimately perish?
Even books, the world first recognized copyright mediums, are perishable at some point. Whether
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something is “inherently changeable” or “being in a state of perpetual change” or not is
philosophically relative and, perhaps, using them as a legal test might not be the most ideal solution
to the unsettled issue of fixation.
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5. UNFIXED WORKS AND LIMITED PROTECTION
If the strict Cartoon Network’s “more than transitory duration test” discussed above is
becoming a prevailing rule, it will exclude a great quantity of contemporary art from federal
copyright protection. This is due to the fact that contemporary artists do not focus on the tangible
products but define the process itself as the art’s core.204 Examples of excluded creative works
include sculptural works with natural media such as land art using natural objects 205, performance
arts in which an artist’s body is a part of the art206, and sculptural works composed of living things
or the so-called “bioart.” 207 That is because these works would be deemed unfixed. The
consequence is that the strict “more than transitory duration test” would leave many contemporary
artists with neither economic nor moral rights—negating the constitutional copyright purpose of
useful arts promotion. 208 Apart from contemporary artists, authors of spontaneous works,
including jazz musicians, stand-up comedians209, or even university lecturers 210 may also lose the
remedies available under the federal copyright regime. Is it fair to exclude only this specific group
of authors from receiving copyright protection to which other groups of artists are entitled? As
justifications for protecting fixed works have already been presented prior, the following argument
will explore the federal copyright protection of unfixed creation. Here, improvisational musical
204
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works such as solos in jazz music will be used for the purpose of argument illustration.211 One will
see that these works are the products of the authors’ labor and can be misappropriated not less than
fixed works are.
5.1 Rhetorics of Copyright
5.1.1

The Rhetoric of Natural Rights

John Locke, a 17th Century English philosopher, introduced the concept of “natural rights,”
which conveys a proposition that an individual is entitled to reap the fruits of his or her creation
or labor. 212 Based on physical property, Locke’s labor theory contends that by combining
“common” things with one’s labor, one owns as his private property what was once in common. 213
Although many scholars are reluctant to connect this conception to intellectual property theory214,
Locke’s labor model played a role in creating the Statute of Anne in 1710. 215 Therefore, as
introduced in Chapter 2 that the Statute was the model for the American copyright law, this
“natural law” conception exists as an alternative to the “utilitarian” concept in the American
copyright regime.
To be able to improvise, musicians must go through years of extensive practice hours. John
Coltrane, an American jazz artist and one of the most influential saxophonists in music history,
practiced tirelessly all day long and even during concert transmissions.216 Every singly note he
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played was unarguably the fruit of his hard work. Thus, applying the Lockean reasoning, one could
see that Coltrane owned the improvisational works he created. This anecdote does not apply only
to Coltrane but also to any artists who express their creative ideas in a non-fixed form of expression
with perseverance demonstrated accordingly.
5.1.2

The Rhetoric of Misappropriation

Based on the natural law argument, this rhetorical mode claims that it is “unfair” for a freerider to profit from someone else’s work of the mind or to “reap where he or she has not sown.”217
The fact that someone else has tried to appropriate the creator’s product of the mind indicates that
such work is worthy of legal protection.218 An empirical study shows that oftentimes excerpts from
improvisational solos in jazz music are transcribed and published; however, not many jazz artists
get remuneration from these publications. 219 Applying the argument under the misappropriation
rhetoric, those other than the original creators have appropriated improvised musical phrases that
signify that the works are worth protecting. Thus, it is “unfair” for jazz artists to have no available
remedies under copyright law when their works of minds are embezzled.
Nonetheless, the two rhetorics do have limitations. When it comes to the consideration of
copyrightability, Lockean reasoning was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1991.
The Court rejected the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" theory developed by lower
courts, which justifies the protection of factual compilations as a reward for an author's hard work.
It reasoned that "sweat of the brow" was not the touchstone of copyright protection; therefore,
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mere fact-based works without original components were not copyrightable. 220 Regarding the
“fairness” argument in the misappropriation rhetoric, there also needs to have a limit. That is
because it is not ideal to have an intellectual property regime that would protect every intellectual
product for an unlimited term,221 which would be against the rhetoric of the public domain. 222
However, it is worth noting that the limitations of the two rhetoric do not only apply to unfixed
works but also fixed works to the same extent. Thus, the rebuttals to these two rhetorics would not
justify excluding unfixed works from federal copyright protection.
5.2 Limited Protection of Unfixed Works in US Jurisdiction
The U.S. jurisdiction, in fact, does not entirely ignore unfixed works; several state courts
have protected the works that have no tangible mediums. Moreover, there are both federal and
state laws that may provide remedies to owners of unfixed materials. Nonetheless, these remedies
available for the authors of unfixed works are extremely limited.
5.2.1

Anti-Bootlegging Provisions

At the federal level, Congress has enacted Section 1101223 outside of the Copyright Act to
prevent unauthorized audio and video recordings of live musical performances pursuant to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPs”). This enactment was
considered a constitutional departure which extends copyright protection to unfixed materials—
musical performances.224 Section 1101(a)(1) prohibits fixation of the sounds and images of a live
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musical performance without performers’ consent, followed by Section 1101(a)(2) and Section
1101(a)(3), which make illegal the transmission and distribution of unauthorizedly fixed
performances, respectively.
However, this current federal copyright law only helps stage artists prevent unauthorized
fixation and distribution of their works in very limited circumstances. For jazz musicians, the AntiBootlegging provisions do not prohibit a member in the audience to remember improvisational
phrases and transcribe them on paper for publication or incorporate them in new works. 225
Moreover, the provisions only apply to cover musical performances, leaving theatrical works, live
comedies, and any other non-musical works involving improvisational elements unprotected.
Therefore, for non-musical works shown on stage for the first time without prepared scripts,
misappropriation through videotaping by an audience member is not prohibited by the law. Not to
mention that nowadays, video recording can be conveniently done by every audience member,
even on the cheapest smartphone.
5.2.2

Common Law Copyright

The fact that unfixed works enjoy no federal copyright protection does not mean that they
go into the public domain right away. Instead, they are considered for protection under the common
law copyright regime. Observed by the New York Court of Appeals, the recognition of unfixed
work under state law resulted from the labor theory’s influence of Locke.226 In Williams v. Weisser,
a professor sued a note service business for selling lecture notes from his classes without
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authorization.227 The court held that the professor owned the common law copyright of the lectures
and “oral delivery of lectures did not divest the plaintiff of his common law copyright to his
lectures.”228
The Copyright Act of 1976, Section 301(b)(1) explicitly declines to preempt state law with
respect to “subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 229 As a result, the Ninth Circuit, for instance, has applied a two-pronged test in
considering preemption of federal copyright law: (1) the work at issue comes within the subject
matter of copyright, and (2) the state law rights are “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright.”230 Nonetheless, not every work that passes the two-prong test
would be protected under common law copyright; there needs to be appliable law, which varies
from state to state. In California, for example, there exists state legislation that protects unfixed
works. For oral lectures, there is a specific bill that bars the commercialization of lecture notes
without consent.231 Such protection was the success of professors in lobbying for legislation and
is, nonetheless, not available in some other states. 232 Besides, for improvisational materials,
California’s statute has a provision that protects improvisational performers and grants them
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“exclusive ownership in the presentation thereof.” 233 However, this protection is one of its kind
and is not available in other states.234
Court precedents, moreover, show that unfixed works are not easily granted with common
law copyright. In Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, the issue presented before the court was
whether “anecdotes, reminiscences, literary opinions and revealing comments” of Ernest
Hemingway that were uttered during an interview could be “literary property” protectable under
New York law. 235 The court rejected state law copyright protection over the subject matters,
reasoning that the author did not “mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of
speech.” 236 Similarly, in Falwell v. Penthouse International, one of the claims brought by the
publication of the plaintiff’s statements made during interviewed constituted Virginia commonlaw copyright infringement. 237 The court, nevertheless, dismissed the claim on the ground that
“[t]here is no defined segregation, either by design or by implication of any of plaintiff's
expressions of his thoughts and opinions on the subjects discussed which would aid in identifying
plaintiff's purported copyrighted material.”238
Nonetheless, such ground is not likely to be applicable for cases in which contemporary
artists or improvisational authors try to protect their unfixed works. That is because it is often
conspicuous to the audience that the author's creative expression is a result of the act of authorship.
For jazz musicians, solos played on stage are intended for artistic purposes rather than mere
noodling. For stand-up comedians, the jokes they improvise are known as parts of their profession
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and are not created to be primarily used in an ordinary course of daily conversation. However, as
there appears to be no case law on improvisational performances and common law copyright, one
possible conclusion is that the common law copyright regime fails to address the performers'
specific problems.239
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6. FORMALITIES AND FIXATION
Formalities of registration and deposition have had a significant role in American copyright
history. Before the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect, the law had required authors to register the
work before publication and deposit a copy of the work with relevant offices.240 The requirement
had been taken seriously as a prerequisite for copyright protection, and non-compliance would
inject the work into the public domain. 241 Nowadays, however, formalities are no longer a
copyright prerequisite; there was a shift towards Automatic Protection pursuant to the Berne
Convention Article 5(2), which stipulates that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights
shall not subject to any formality…” Nonetheless, the importance of formalities remains, as
authors of creative works are still highly incentivized to comply with such.
Copyright registration was designed to make a public record of the basic facts in a
copyright claim, 242 entitling the public access to useful information about the owner of the
underlying work. Although registration is not a copyright prerequisite under the Copyright Act of
1976, copyright owners have several inducements to register their works. First, Section 411(a)
clarifies that registration is a requirement for bringing a copyright suit before a federal court. 243
Second, registration establishes prima facie evidence of validity in the work copyright if such
action is made within five years from the date of publication according to Section 410(c). 244
Moreover, registration made within three months from the date of publication of the work permits
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statutory damages and attorney fees under Section 412.245 Even though there has been a relatively
small number of registrants due to the reduced role of registration formality 246, the inducements
for copyright registration in the United States are higher than those in other jurisdictions. 247
Moreover, the importance of registration is so significant that it could exclude unregistered works
from federal suits. Therefore, copyright holders who have rights that cannot be enforced are
indistinguishable from authors of unfixed works who receive no copyright protection at all.
Deposition formality is a requirement that copyright holders must deposit at least one copy
of the underlying copyright work that has been published. This deposition is required as a part of
the registration process at the Copyright Office;248 additionally, it can also be demanded in writing
by the registrar at the Library of Congress.249 As a part of the registration process, Section 408(b)
requires “in the case of unpublished work, one complete copy or phonorecord.” For published
work, the law requires “two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition.” Alternatively,
deposition of published works can be made at the Library of Congress, which Section 407(a)
generally requires two complete copies of the best editions. Non-compliance with the timely
deposition demand made by the Register of Copyrights will result in monetary fines.250
These formalities help serve at least two purposes; firstly, they provide the public with
information about the work and the owner of such work; and secondly, they help indicate works
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that the authors care and desire to protect. 251 Deposit requirements, in particular, “are consistent
with the preservation of cultural heritage and with copyright's constitutional copyright purpose to
‘promote the progress of science,’ by which the Founders meant knowledge.”252
Importantly, the two formalities require submitting one or two copies in certain cases of
the underlying copyright work. By producing a copy, there needs to be some iteration of fixation.
Therefore, the author of an unfixed work who cares to exercise his rights would eventually find a
need to fix the work and submit a copy in the copyright registration process. In other words, even
without fixation as a copyright prerequisite, fixation of creative expression will, nevertheless, must
be made to satisfy the registration formality. Therefore, fixation as a copyright prerequisite in the
copyright regime where formalities are demanded is not necessary.
If a work will need to be fixed anyway to enjoy full remedies available under copyright
law, what is the difference between having or not having fixation as a copyright prerequisite? First,
the authors of creative works, regardless of the nature of mediums of expression, will be adequately
entitled to copyright protection. The authors who pursue contemporary arts with transitory
mediums of expression and the artists who perform improvisations will receive copyright
ownership, as do other artists, resulting in a non-discriminatory copyright standard. Secondly, an
unfixed work will begin receiving copyright protection from the date of expression of idea rather
than the date of fixation. Thus, if an author of an unfixed work later fixes the work, the work will
be protected by copyright law during the interval when the work has not been fixed. Accordingly,
a misappropriation happening during the interval would constitute a copyright infringement claim,
giving the author a chance to seek remedies under copyright law.

251

Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. REV. 485 (2004).

252

Samuelson et al., supra note 246, at 1187.

49

Hypothesis Scenario
To clarify the above arguments, consider the following hypothetical scenario, which
involves musical improvisation, the use of new technologies, and how fixation will create an
adverse result upon the author.
A jazz music professor, teaching a virtual class, improvised a beautiful jazz phrase to his
students. One student, wanting to study every note the professor plays, activates a music
transcription software253 on his computer, which transcribes the improvisational excerpt into music
notation without the professor’s knowledge. After studying the phrase at the student’s own time,
the student finds that the work is a perfect example of an improvisational method he has been
developing. As a result, he includes the professor’s material into his jazz improvisation tutorial
book to be published for sales. To make sample recordings for each particular work included in
the book, he plays his works and the professor's work on his instrument and records them in MP3
files, which he bundles with the books put them all for sales. These materials receive a lot of
attention, generating income for the student. Later, the professor finds out that his work has been
stolen and used in the student’s book. The professor, thus, claims the ownership of his musical
phrase, asking the student for a share of the profits.
Under the current federal copyright law that has the fixation requirement, it would be
unfortunate for the professor as he will not be able to claim copyright ownership and exercise any
rights over the improvisational phrase. That is because the musical work has never been fixed
under his authority.254 Apart from that, the copyright over the phrase could even belong to the
253

A software that can detect musical notes from a soundwave and notate them on a sheet music. See, e.g.,
AnthemScore (https://www.lunaverus.com/).

254

Transmission of audio in the live streaming process during the virtual class is not likely to constitute fixation,
especially under the “more than transitory duration” test. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 53 (1976). Moreover, the
authorship-as-fixation requirement excludes the professor from obtaining copyright ownership because the work is
notated by the student’s transcription software or fixed by the student in other words.
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student, as the fact that the student employs the music transcription software instead of using an
audio recording or video recording program would make the Anti-Bootlegging provisions
irrelevant and may give copyright to the student as he has fixed the work.255 In addition, as the
student plays the phrase on his instrument and records it, he would also be the copyright owner of
the sound recording. Not fixing the work, the professor will have no available remedies under the
copyright law. Thus, he could not use a copy of the notation made by the student’s transcription
program for depository purposes256 that would give him the standing to sue in a federal court. 257
Moreover, provided that the professor starts constructing his copyright claim by writing down the
phrase in the music sheet after learning about the misappropriation, copyright over the work would
commence at the time of the writing. In other words, there will be no copyright during the interval
in which the work has not been fixed, giving the professor a hard time alleging copyright
infringement over the student’s activities.258
However, given there is no fixation requirement imposed, the professor would have owned
copyright over the musical improvisation from the date he first plays it. As discussed in earlier
chapters, idea/expression dichotomy and creativity can already suffice the requirements of
copyright in several civil law jurisdictions. Without fixation, the copyright prerequisites in the
United States would resemble those in civil law nations. As a result, with the work passing the two
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This anticipation is based on the potential copyright ownership of a person who makes an audio recording on
mobile phone. The act of pressing the transcription button and pressing the recording button could be of no
difference. Nonetheless, theoretically it could be argued that activating the music transcription program, although
fixation occurs, does not require creativity.
256

See Alicia v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the deposit requirement was not met when
the plaintiffs used the allegedly infringing recordings as deposit material).

257

As previously discussed, registration is a prerequisite to bringing an infringement suit in courts.

258
See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that “in order to establish a
claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show ownership…”).
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prerequisites259, the professor will have a second chance to prove the ownership of his work, which
will be a matter of evidence in court. He may, for instance, use a student's transcription program's
activity history to show that the program was activated during the class he taught.

259

When the professor played the jazz phrase on his instrument, his musical idea was expressed. And improvisation
is a core aspect of musical creativity. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright
and Musical Innovation, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1829, 1840 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
As the Berne Convention leaves the state members open to decide whether to have a
fixation requirement in their copyright legislations, the civil law countries that may have followed
the French copyright tradition generally do not require copyright works to be fixed. For instance,
in France, Germany, China, and Thailand, their provisions on fixation requirements only apply to
limited subject matters. As a result, sermons and lectures, for example, have been recognized as
copyright subject matters by courts in France and China, respectively. The United States, on the
other hand, incorporates British copyright tradition in its copyright system. American copyright
law prioritizes the protection of “writings” rather than primarily protecting authors’ intellectual
and moral interests. Accordingly, previous copyright legislations listed copyright subject matters
that have tangible mediums, and the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly contains provisions on the
requirement of fixation. A series of precedents, however, suggest that the fixation has been having
a hard time adapting to new technologies. Up to this point, it is still uncertain if one should consider
how long exactly a medium of work needs to last to satisfy the statutory language of “a period of
more than transitory duration.”
Consequently, contemporary arts expressed on inherently changing mediums may not
enjoy copyright protection as other art forms do. Such arts, as well as improvisational works and
other works that do not require a medium of expression, are unarguable the products of artists’
labor. Because these works are capable of being misappropriated, especially when everyone with
a mobile phone can conveniently make an audio or video recording, the unfixed works should be
entitled to copyright protection. Nonetheless, the unfixed works are subject to much lesser
protection. Anti-bootlegging law, for instance, only applies for audio or video recording of live
musical performances, while common-law copyright does not effectively do the job.
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Regarding the registration and deposit formalities' role, the research finds that they can
serve the same function as the fixation requirement. For an author interested in protecting their
work in court, they must register the work and deposit at least one copy anyway. And by discarding
fixation as a copyright prerequisite, the author will have a chance in courts upon creating a
document and comply with the registration process, leaving copyright ownership as the matter of
proof. Authors of unfixed works will be incentivized to fix the works accordingly. In light of
promoting useful arts, copyright law should welcome new artforms and accommodate new
technologies. With the registration and deposition formalities, the thesis contends that fixation,
which makes copyright law inflexible, should be discarded.
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